Mr. Bush @ New Ruskin College
http://www.newruskincollege.com/
Lecture Notes: 7-9-07
I told you so Part II
Dear Mr. President;
So now after much delay and many casualties you are considering pulling our troops back to military reservations from which they can assist the Iraqi Army with logistics and training, and striking high value targets, instead of trying to do everything ourselves. Good.
You could have followed this policy years ago when I first proposed it, and avoided many casualties. But better late than never. Unfortunately now there is a question of whether Congress will allow you to keep the troops in Iraq even in this deployment.
Instead of allowing the Iraqi Army to take the lead as I advised, you disbanded it, and put our troops out on point patrolling the dusty streets of Iraq. The resulting casualties have so eroded support that you may not now be allowed to keep them in Iraq.
And what is possibly even worse you allowed the enemy to define success as his ability to carry out tactical operations. As long as he can set off a car bomb somewhere in Iraq he wins for you have allowed this to serve as the definition of our “winning.” You confused tactical success with our strategic goals.
In other words during the intervening years, and intervening casualties, you allowed our strategic goal, of having our troops deployed in Iraq were they could serve as a backstop for the Iraqi Army, (and a counter weight to prevent the odd coup), to be undermined by casualties taken for short term tactical goals. Tactics over strategy. A classic example of winning every battle and losing the war.
From a larger philosophical perspective we can agree with Alan Watts when he said that “the goody goodies are the thieves of virtue.” By doing everything for the Iraqis you have prevented virtuous Iraqis from coming forward. Or as I put it several years ago: There is a reason the cavalry only comes to the rescue in the third reel . . . if they came to the rescue in the first reel there wouldn’t be a picture.
Your officers are all type ‘A’ personalities. Their aggressiveness and controlling personalities have their advantage in most military problems yet what was required here was more subtlety. From a systems point of view the Iraqi political social system was too complex for an outsider, even one trained at West Point, to master.
For example, the question of which militias to incorporate into the Iraqi Army and which to disarm and disband, is one best left to those whose lives depend on the outcome of the question. Nothing would focus the attention of the Iraqi Parliament so much as knowing that their security is being provided not by the American Army but by their own officers that they have themselves promoted to office.
Hopefully it is still not too late to salvage our strategic goal of having a force situated in Iraq to guarantee the newly won independence of the Iraqi people.
http://www.newruskincollege.com/
Lecture Notes: 7-9-07
I told you so Part II
Dear Mr. President;
So now after much delay and many casualties you are considering pulling our troops back to military reservations from which they can assist the Iraqi Army with logistics and training, and striking high value targets, instead of trying to do everything ourselves. Good.
You could have followed this policy years ago when I first proposed it, and avoided many casualties. But better late than never. Unfortunately now there is a question of whether Congress will allow you to keep the troops in Iraq even in this deployment.
Instead of allowing the Iraqi Army to take the lead as I advised, you disbanded it, and put our troops out on point patrolling the dusty streets of Iraq. The resulting casualties have so eroded support that you may not now be allowed to keep them in Iraq.
And what is possibly even worse you allowed the enemy to define success as his ability to carry out tactical operations. As long as he can set off a car bomb somewhere in Iraq he wins for you have allowed this to serve as the definition of our “winning.” You confused tactical success with our strategic goals.
In other words during the intervening years, and intervening casualties, you allowed our strategic goal, of having our troops deployed in Iraq were they could serve as a backstop for the Iraqi Army, (and a counter weight to prevent the odd coup), to be undermined by casualties taken for short term tactical goals. Tactics over strategy. A classic example of winning every battle and losing the war.
From a larger philosophical perspective we can agree with Alan Watts when he said that “the goody goodies are the thieves of virtue.” By doing everything for the Iraqis you have prevented virtuous Iraqis from coming forward. Or as I put it several years ago: There is a reason the cavalry only comes to the rescue in the third reel . . . if they came to the rescue in the first reel there wouldn’t be a picture.
Your officers are all type ‘A’ personalities. Their aggressiveness and controlling personalities have their advantage in most military problems yet what was required here was more subtlety. From a systems point of view the Iraqi political social system was too complex for an outsider, even one trained at West Point, to master.
For example, the question of which militias to incorporate into the Iraqi Army and which to disarm and disband, is one best left to those whose lives depend on the outcome of the question. Nothing would focus the attention of the Iraqi Parliament so much as knowing that their security is being provided not by the American Army but by their own officers that they have themselves promoted to office.
Hopefully it is still not too late to salvage our strategic goal of having a force situated in Iraq to guarantee the newly won independence of the Iraqi people.
http://www.newruskincollege.com/
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